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NEW LIMITS, NEW LICENSES? THE IMPACT OF ADAMS
v. MURAKAMI ON THE CALIFORNIA PUNITIVE
DAMAGES SYSTEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages1 have never enjoyed unquestioned acceptance.
This doctrine has its staunch supporters and its vehement critics. Al-
though the debate over punitive damages is not new, there is a grow-
ing trend to limit the amounts awarded.
One major criticism of punitive damages is the essentially un-
bridled freedom of the jury to award amounts solely within their
discretion.2 In particular, recent attacks have taken the form of ap-
pellate challenges to punitive damages awards that exceed the de-
fendant's ability to pay.' The awards "seem to be limited only by the
ability of lawyers to string zeros together in drafting a complaint." 4
Accordingly, the financial condition or wealth' of the defendant has
become an issue of increased importance in civil trials involving pu-
nitive damages claims."
The California Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue of a
defendant's wealth in Adams v. Murakami. The court held that
evidence of a defendant's financial condition is a prerequisite to a
punitive damages award8 and that the plaintiff bears the burden of
production and proof of such evidence.9 The court determined this
1. In California, punitive damages are "damages other than compensatory damages
which may be awarded against a person to punish him for outrageous conduct." Wetherbee v.
United Ins. Co. of America, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (Ct. App. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991); Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978); Dumas v. Stocker, 262 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1989).
4. OKI America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
5. In Adams, the California Supreme Court declined to set forth the proper measure-
ment of a defendant's financial condition, noting that one measurement may not always be
appropriate. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1355 n.7. The terms "financial condition" and "wealth,"
therefore, will be used interchangeably to refer to such measurements as net worth, net income
or profits from the alleged wrongdoing.
6. See, e.g., TOM RILEY, PROVING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE COMPLETE HANDBOOK
(1981) (the author's text is a guide to proving punitive damages, with detailed strategies for
trial counsel).
7. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991).
8. Id. at 1349.
9. Id. at 1357.
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evidence was necessary for appellate review of the award when a
defendant claims the award is excessive.1
This comment explores the conflict Adams has created with the
punitive damages system currently in place under the California
Civil Code." The author argues that although the California Su-
preme Court's opinion suggests that requiring evidence of defend-
ant's financial condition may limit punitive damages, 2 in fact the
presentation of such evidence could actually have the opposite effect:
namely, inflating otherwise sufficient awards.
The comment begins in Part II.A with a brief description of the
status of punitive damages in the United States, describing several
criticisms of the doctrine and some limits which various jurisdictions
have placed on the doctrine. The author discusses the California pu-
nitive damages system in Parts II.B and C, including the purpose of
punitive damages and the procedure for obtaining a punitive dam-
ages award. In Part II.D, the author discusses the California appel-
late courts' split of authority as to the necessity of evidence of a de-
fendant's financial condition. The author also addresses the practical
impact of placing the burdens of production and proof on the plain-
tiff in light of the California Supreme Court's objective of placing
financial evidence in the trial record for subsequent review of puni-
tive damage awards. Finally, in Part IV, the author proposes
amending the California Civil Code to provide trifurcation in trials
involving punitive damages in order to preserve the purpose of puni-
tive damages in this state. In addition, the author suggests the de-
fendant bear the burden of proof on the financial condition issue and
that the standard California punitive damages jury instruction be ad-
justed to reflect the proposed changes in the Civil Code.
10. Id. at 1355.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West 1993); see discussion infra parts II.F.2, III. Al-
though the facts of Adams are quite interesting, the question before the California Supreme
Court was a legal one. This comment, therefore, does not present a factual summary of the
case. For a detailed description of the Adams facts, see the case as reported by the Court of
Appeal pending the Supreme Court's disposition. Adams v. Murakami, 268 Cal. Rptr. 467,
468-70 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part, 813 P.2d 1348 (1991). In general, the facts underlying
the cases discussed in this comment are not relevant to what are largely legal issues. The
author refers the reader to the cases themselves for factual information.
12. See Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 532, 540 (Ct. App. 1992).
"As [the California] Supreme Court has pointed out, the defendant's financial condition is an
essential limitation on the jury's discretion in this state." Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Criticism, Challenges and Limits
Punitive damages have incited fierce debate since they were first
awarded in the United States. In 1873, Justice Foster of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court referred to the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages as a "monstrous heresy . . . an unsightly and an unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.""3 Crit-
icism of punitive damages continues to the present. They are disap-
proved as punishment in a civil system of law that is meant to be
compensatory. 4 They have been called a "windfall" to the
plaintiff.1 5
Punitive damages have also been attacked by way of several
constitutional arguments, including double jeopardy, the Excessive
Fines Clause, cruel and unusual punishment, and due process viola-
tions."' The double jeopardy argument contends that where a de-
fendant's conduct could subject it to both civil and criminal liability,
the defendant is exposed to both punitive damages and criminal fines
in violation of the Constitution.17 The United States Supreme Court
has rejected that argument, however, concluding that for the double
jeopardy prohibition to apply, the case must be "essentially
criminal."1"
Litigants have also used the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution to support an argument that punitive damages
are unconstitutional. For example, one litigant suggested that puni-
tive damages violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 9 The Court concluded that the clause was not impli-
cated, but left open the possibility that an excessive fines argument
could apply in other cases involving government rather than private
parties." Other litigants have used the Eighth Amendment to argue
that the imposition of punitive damages constitutes cruel and un-
13. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
14. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 2, at 4 (4th ed. 1985).
15. See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive
Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 17-29.
17. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528.
19. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989).
20. Id. at 268; see also James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages: State Extraction Practice
Is Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 119 (1990).
1993]
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usual punishment.21 This argument has been rejected because puni-
tive damages are civil, and the Eighth Amendment only places re-
strictions on criminal actions."2
Critics have also attacked the punitive damages doctrine as pun-
ishment without control in violation of the Due Process Clause." A
United States Supreme Court Justice suggested that the "grant of
wholly standardless discretion to determine the severity of punish-
ment appears inconsistent with due process." '24 This is an equitable
argument, suggesting that a defendant subjected to punitive damages
often is treated more harshly than a defendant convicted of a crime.2
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]here is some
authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause
places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made pursu-
ant to a statutory scheme."21 6 The Court recently reviewed a due pro-
cess challenge to the Alabama common law procedures for scrutiniz-
ing punitive damages awards in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip.27 In upholding the procedures, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that they "ensure[d] meaningful and adequate review . . .
whenever a jury has fixed the punitive damages."28 In the same case,
however, the Supreme Court expressed concern about punitive dam-
ages that "run wild."2"
In addition to constitutional challenges, litigants, courts, and
legislatures have attempted to limit punitive damages in various
ways. A complete elimination of punitive damages is the most obvi-
ous limit. Nebraska, for example, does not recognize the doctrine and
does not permit recovery of punitive damages."0 Other states place
21. Daugherty v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
22. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 217 (Colo. 1984).
23. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1043 (1991).
24. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 14, § 2, at 26 (noting the disparate treatment
argument is based on procedural and substantive safeguards present in criminal law, but ab-
sent from civil law).
26. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1039 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989)).
27. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, Ill S. Ct. 1032 (1991). Under Alabama
law, the jury's punitive damages verdict is subjected to post-trial scrutiny at the trial and
appellate levels. The criteria used in the evaluation includes the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, profits from wrongdoing, and the "financial position" of the defend-
ant. Id. at 1044-45.
28. Id. at 1044.
29. Id. at 1043.
30. Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960) (stating that punitive, vindictive
or exemplary damages are not allowed in Nebraska).
[Vol. 33
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sharp limits on the recovery of punitive damages, such as permitting
recovery only where expressly authorized by statute. For example,
Louisiana prohibits punitive damages "unless it be for some particu-
lar wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes . . .such pen-
alty."81 Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Washington also follow
this approach.
3 2
Still other states treat punitive damages as compensatory dam-
ages. Connecticut, for example, permits what it calls punitive dam-
ages, but the damages are limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses
less any taxable costs.33 Michigan also limits punitive damages to
compensatory functions only, such as injury to feelings or humilia-
tion.84 Georgia follows this approach as well, permitting damages for
deterrence or compensation, but not for both.86
Punitive damage awards may also be limited by specifying a
particular dollar amount for an award. Maximum dollar amounts or
a specific ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages are
examples of such statutory limits.36 Colorado sets a maximum dollar
amount for punitive damages by requiring that they not exceed the
31. McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385-86 (La. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 661 (1932); see also Banner Chevrolet, Inc. v. Kelt, 402 So. 2d 747, 752 (La. App.
1981).
32. Massachusetts permits recovery of punitive damages only where authorized by stat-
ute. See Pine v. Rust, 535 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Mass. 1989); City of Lowell v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943). New Hampshire's legislature recently
enacted s statute which prohibits punitive damages except where the law specifically provides
for them. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1992) (effective July 1, 1986). Prior to adopting
this approach, New Hampshire permitted punitive damages, but such damages had only a
compensatory function. Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984).
Washington also permits punitive damages only when authorized by statute. Fisher Properties,
Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986) (punitive damages not permitted
unless expressly authorized by statute); see also Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441,
444 (Wash. 1981), modified, 649 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1982).
33. See Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn. 1966);
Sullivan v. Hopkins, 485 A.2d 942, 943 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
34. See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980)
(embarrassment and injured feelings); Willett v. Ford Motor Co., 253 N.W.2d 111, 113
(Mich. 1977) ("humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity").
35. See Westview Cemetery, Inc. v. Blanchard, 216 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ga. 1975).
36. Several states have placed some form of maximum on the amount that may be recov-
ered as punitive damages. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1992) (maximum dollar
amounts); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1989) (maximum dollar amounts); FLA. STAT
ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (specific ratio); GA. CODE ANN. § 51- 12-5.1(g)
(Harrison 1990) (maximum dollar amounts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.3701(e) (Supp. 1992)
(maximum dollar amounts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (maximum dollar
amounts); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1993) (maximum
dollar amounts or specific ratio); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (maximum dol-
lar amounts).
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amount of "actual damages awarded to the injured party."7 Alabama
limits punitive damages to $250,000 unless the defendant's conduct is
part of a pattern of intentional wrongs, involves actual malice, or is
libel, slander, or defamation. 8 Florida limits punitive awards to no
more than three times the amount of compensatory damages. 9
Texas permits a ratio of four times the actual damages or $200,000,
whichever is greater.40 Accordingly, limitation mechanisms for puni-
tive damage awards vary widely by state.
B. Punitive Damages in California
1. Purpose
Punitive damages, also called exemplary damages, are essen-
tially a form of punishment."1 California's punitive damages system
is based on a punishment and deterrence rationale. The purpose of
punitive damages in California is simply "for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant."4 In Neal v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange,48 the California Supreme Court reiterated the
public goal of punitive damages as a societal interest in "punish[ing]
wrongdoing and thereby protect[ing] itself from future misconduct,
either by the same defendant or other potential wrongdoers. ' '44
Thus, in California, punitive damages are not compensatory," 5 since
the court directs the jury to "determine whether you should award
punitive damages against defendant . . . for the sake of example and
by way of punishment."' "4 Therefore, although the plaintiff seeks,
and may be awarded, punitive damages, it is incorrect to categorize a
37. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1989).
38. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1992).
39. FLA. STAT ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Supp. 1993).
40. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1993)
41. Punitive is defined as "[rielating to punishment; having the character of punishment
or penalty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
42. CAL. Csv. CODE § 3294(a). See infra text accompanying note 48 for the text of this
section.
In 1934, the California Supreme Court held that the purpose of punitive damages under
California law was "to punish the wrongdoer ... and to deter him from the commission of like
wrongs." Evans v. Gibson, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1934); see also Wetherbee v. United Ins.
Co. of America, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (Ct. App. 1971) (stating that punitive damages are
"damages other than compensatory damages, which may be awarded against a person to pun-
ish him for outrageous conduct").
43. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978).
44. Id. at 990.
45. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, BAJI 14.72.2 (1989 Re-Revision)
(7th ed. Supp. 1993).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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claim for such damages as a claim for relief. Punitive damages go
beyond mere compensation to the plaintiff for the actual harm in-
curred. "Damages which are given merely as a punishment to deter
the wrongdoer from a repetition of the offense clearly have no refer-
ence to compensation for the wrong inflicted."'4 7 Accordingly, it is the
assessment of punitive damages against the defendant, rather than
their receipt by the plaintiff, that furthers the public goal of punish-
ment and deterrence.
2. Liability and Procedure
In California, liability for punitive damages arises when the de-
fendant has acted with oppression, fraud or malice. The California
Civil Code provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or mal-
ice, the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.48
However, punitive damages are not awarded automatically. Even
though the jury might conclude that the defendant is guilty of op-
pression, fraud or malice, it may choose not to impose punitive dam-
ages.49 The jury similarly has discretion to determine the amount of
the punitive damages award, 0 but its discretion does not go wholly
unchecked. Two features of California punitive damages law limit
the jury's control over punitive damages awards. First, at the trial
level, the court gives the jury factors to assist it in assessing the
amount of the award. The standard jury instruction directs the jury
to consider the following:
(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant. (2)
The amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent
effect on the defendant in the light of defendant's financial con-
dition. [(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relation to the injury, harm, or damage actually suffered by the
plaintiff.]5'
47. Evans v. Gibson, 31 P.2d 389, 390 (Cal. 1934).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993).
49. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, supra note 45, BAJI 14.72.2 (1989
Re-Revision).
50. Id.
51. Id. "Paragraph number 3 is in brackets and must be given if requested by the de-
fendant." Id. use note.
1993]
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Judicial review serves as the second potential limit on a punitive
damage award. 2 In the traditional approach to awarding punitive
damages, the jury determines the amount of punitive damages, and
the award may then be subjected to trial and appellate review "to
ensure that it is reasonable." 8 California follows this approach."
C. Evaluation of Punitive Damages Awards in California
Although the jury lacks unlimited discretion in awarding puni-
tive damages, its verdict is nonetheless accorded "great weight [on
appeal]. [The court] may not tamper with it unless [the court] can
say, as a matter of law, that the jury acted from passion or
prejudice.""8 Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange8  set forth this
"passion or prejudice" standard which has become the traditional
California analysis for evaluating a punitive damages award.
The Adams court emphasized that because of the public goal of
punitive damages, in evaluating an award, "[tlhe essential question.
. .in every case must be whether the amount of damages awarded
substantially serves the societal interest.""7 Adams explained that in
answering that question, the California Supreme Court in Neal v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange advanced three factors to be used in
determining whether an award raises a presumption that it is the
product of passion or prejudice and is thus excessive as a matter of
law: 1) the nature of the defendant's conduct in light of the entire
record; 2) the amount of compensatory damages; and 3) the wealth
of the defendant. 8 The California Supreme Court stated in Neal
that the defendant's wealth was a factor; however, the court did not
hold that evidence of the defendant's wealth was required."
The Neal court also clearly indicated that there must be some
52. See infra part II.2.C.
53. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042 (1991); see Adams v.
Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350 (1991) (stating that the appellate function is to determine
whether a punitive damages award is excessive as a matter of law or is presumptively a prod-
uct of passion or prejudice); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUcrIONS CIVIL, supra note 45, BAJI
14.72.2 (1989 Re-Revision).
54. See Adams, 813 P.2d at 1350.
55. Pistorius v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 176 Cal. Rptr. 660, 668 (Ct. App.
1981).
56. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978). Specifically, the standard is
whether the "award as a matter of law appears excessive, or ... raise[s] a presumption that it
is the result of passion or prejudice." Id. at 990 (quoting Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co.,
523 P.2d 662, 669 (Cal. 1974)).
57. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1350.
58. Neal, 582 P.2d at 990.
59. See id.
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limit to punitive damage awards. The court stated that excessive
awards frustrate the purpose of punitive damages because "the func-
tion of punitive damages is not served by an award which, in light of
the defendant's wealth and the gravity of the particular act, exceeds
the level necessary to properly punish and deter." 60 In California,
then, punitive damages are excessive as a matter of law if they ex-
ceed the defendant's ability to pay." Moreover, even if an award
satisfies the court with regard to the other Neal factors, it will be
overturned it is excessive. 2
D. Development of a Split of Authority
Prior to Adams, there was a split of authority in the California
Courts of Appeal as to whether evidence of a defendant's financial
condition was required to support a punitive damages award." Some
courts required financial evidence while others simply permitted it.
The 1963 case of Hanley v. Lund 4 was an initial "permissive" au-
thority. In Hanley, the defendant did not claim that the punitive
damages were excessive during post-trial motions or the appeal.6"
However, he argued on appeal that the plaintiff was required to
demonstrate the defendant's wealth in order to request punitive dam-
ages.6" The court of appeal ruled that the defendant's claim had no
merit since there was no authority to support such a requirement.67
The court noted that the cases upon which the defendant relied to
support his argument dealt with the admissibility rather than the
necessity of evidence of defendant's wealth."
Evidence of the defendant's wealth has been admissible in puni-
tive damages cases in California for almost one hundred years. 9 In
Barkly v. Copeland, a slander case, the court admitted financial con-
dition evidence in order to "graduate the punishment. ' 70 In fact, the
court admitted the evidence because it concluded that the degree of
60. Id.
61. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1351.
62. Id. "[Tlhe award can be so disproportionate to the defendant's ability to pay that
the award is excessive for that reason alone." Id.
63. See id. 1353-54.
64. Hanley v. Lund, 32 Cal. Rptr. 733, 740 (Ct. App. 1963).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 740.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Barkly v. Copeland, 15 P. 307, 310 (Cal. 1903).
70. Id.
19931
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plaintiff's injury was correlated to the defendant's wealth." Later
courts followed the Barkly example, concluding that financial condi-
tion evidence was admissible to determine the proper level of the
defendant's punishment.7 ' However, these cases did not go so far as
to require presentation of the evidence a.7  Even after Hanley, the
courts held that a plaintiff could choose to introduce evidence of the
defendant's financial condition, but was not required to do so. 74
Moreover, even after Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 7 desig-
nated the defendant's wealth as a factor to consider in evaluating a
punitive damages award,"6 some appellate courts were reluctant to
require the plaintiff to present financial condition evidence.
For example, the trial court in Vossler v. Richards Manufac-
turing Co. 7  held that the plaintiff was not required to introduce
evidence of the defendant's financial condition to support a claim for
punitive damages.78 On appeal, the defendant relied on Neal 9 to
support his argument that punitive damages could not be awarded
unless the plaintiff produced evidence of the defendant's wealth or
profits due to the wrongful conduct. 80 The Vossler court responded
that although Neal held that the wealth of the defendant should be
considered in determining whether a punitive damages award was
excessive as a matter of law, a plaintiff's claim for punitive damages
was not dependent upon introduction of such evidence.8" The court
71. Id. "[TIhe defendant's wealth is an element in [his] social rank and influence, and
therefore tends to show the extent of the injury suffered from the defendant's words .... " Id.
72. See, e.g., Marriott v. Williams, 93 P. 875, 877 (Cal. 1908); Greeneberg v. Western
Turf Ass'n, 73 P. 1050, 1052 (Cal. 1903).
73. See Marriott, 93 P. at 877; Greeneberg, 73 P. at 1052.
74. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970) (hold-
ing that financial condition evidence was not necessary to support a punitive damages award);
see also Fenlon v. Brock, 265 Cal. Rptr. 324, 327 (Ct. App. 1989); Vossler v. Richards Mfg.
Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 219, 226 (Ct. App. 1983). A plaintiff might choose to present financial
condition evidence as a matter of strategy, attempting to gain a greater award by demonstrat-
ing the wealth of the defendant. See Guy 0. KORNBLUM ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
GUIDE: BAD FAITH 11-66.1 (1990). "Regardless of the burden of proof, it is better for the
plaintiff to introduce evidence of the [defendant's] finances, to show the defendant is capable of
absorbing a substantial penalty." Id.
75. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978).
76. Neal, 582 P.2d at 990; see supra text accompanying note 58.
77. Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct. App. 1983).
78. Id. at 226.
79. See supra part II.C. for a discussion of Neal.
80. Vossler, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
81. Id. Other courts have also followed this approach. In Fenlon v. Brock, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1989), the defendants failed to claim that the punitive damages awarded
against them were excessive at trial but appealed, arguing that the award could not be upheld
absent evidence of their financial condition. Id. at 327. The Fenlon court rejected this conten-
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recognized that the purpose of punitive damages was "to punish and
deter wrongdoing by fashioning a monetary penalty tailored to the
wealth of the defendant and to the reprehensibility of his conduct" 8
and stated that a lack of financial condition evidence "impairs a ra-
tional effectuation of this purpose."8" Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that because a plaintiff was not required to produce such evi-
dence in order to support a claim for punitive damages, its decision
was in accord with precedent and the "modern trend" to require the
defendant to demonstrate that an award was excessive in light of his
financial condition. 84
Other courts, however, came to the opposite conclusion. They
expressed concern over the lack of evidence to support punitive dam-
ages claims88 and looked to the plaintiff to provide the financial con-
dition information.86 In Dumas v. Stocker,87 the court of appeal
noted that there was no evidence of the defendant's net worth at trial
and that the plaintiff made no effort to obtain this evidence "despite
the statutory mechanism designed precisely to allow for discovery
and production of such information for use at trial." '88
The Dumas court refers to the "statutory mechanism" of the
California Civil Code section 3295(c).89 The court concluded that
without evidence of the defendant's net worth, the punitive damages
award was unsupported by the evidence. 90 It concluded that reversal
was appropriate because without evidence of the defendant's wealth,
the court could not determine whether the award was "reasonable in
light of [defendant's] resources." 1 The Dumas court reasoned that
permitting, but not requiring, financial condition evidence "frustrates
tion, stating that although Neal stated that the defendant's financial condition is one factor to
consider, the evidence of financial condition was not a prerequisite to a punitive damages
award. Id. Fenlon also noted that many cases had upheld punitive damages awards without
evidence of the defendant's condition and that the "long standing" rule in California was that
a plaintiff was permitted, but not required, to produce such evidence. Id.
82. Vossler, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Forte v. Nolfi, 102 Cal. Rptr. 455, 476 (Ct. App. 1972) (overturning a punitive
damages award because of some uncertainty as to the compensatory damages and concern
about a lack of evidence to sustain a punitive damages claim); see also Barragan v. Banco
BCH, 232 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Ct. App. 1986); Alhino v. Starr, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Ct. App.
1980).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 87-95.
87. Dumas v. Stocker, 262 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1989).
88. Id. at 315.
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(c) (West Supp. 1993); see discussion infra part II.F.2.
90. Dumas, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
91. id.
1993]
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meaningful appellate review of punitive damage awards, [because]
the absence of evidence of net worth precludes an appellate court
from deciding whether an award might, for example, bankrupt the
defendant."92
The Dumas court also justified its holding in terms of the bur-
den of proof. It stated that a permissive rule would obviate both the
traditional burden of proof (by shifting the burden to the defendant)
and "the rule precluding recovery based on speculative .. . evi-
dence."" The court thus rejected Vossler's suggestion that it would
be appropriate to shift the traditional burden of proof since the de-
fendant knows his financial situation better than the plaintiff."' The
Dumas court concluded that this shifting argument "ignores . . .the
discovery and subpoena provisions [in Civil Code section 3295(c)]
which enable plaintiff to have financial evidence under his control at
trial."9
Fenlon v. Brock also rejected the appellate review and the bur-
den-shifting arguments.96 The Fenlon court reasoned that even
though financial condition evidence was not required, the defendant
had the best access to this evidence and could always choose to intro-
duce it in order to demonstrate an award was excessive.97 Also, the
court noted that the defendant should not be permitted to rely on the
plaintiff to introduce evidence in order to preserve an appeal." "It is
not the duty of a litigant to create a record for an opponent's poten-
tial appeal." 99
In Vossler v. Richards Manufacturing Co., the court rejected
the contention that requiring a defendant to present financial condi-
tion evidence was "manifestly" unfair.1 00 The defendant in Vossler
argued that such a requirement "would be, for all intents and pur-
poses, requiring the defendant to make a tacit admission that some
award of punitive damages is appropriate. '10 In response, the court
declared that the defendants were completely capable of introducing
the required evidence without sacrificing themselves to the jury. 0
92. Id. at 316.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Fenlon v. Brock, 265 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328 (Ct. App. 1989).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Vossler v. Richards Mfg. Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 219, 226 (Ct. App. 1983).
101. id.
102. Id.
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The court analogized the presentation of financial evidence to a situ-
ation in which the defendant tries to reduce his exposure to personal
injury damages. It noted that personal injury defendants "regularly
introduce evidence tending to show that plaintiffs injuries are less
than claimed;" therefore, defendants have the ability to introduce
mitigating evidence "without diminishing the force of their contest as
to liability. ' 03
However, the Fenlon court concluded that requiring the plain-
tiff to produce financial evidence actually could be both unfair to the
defendant and a waste of time. The court reasoned that if a plaintiff
is required to prove defendant's financial condition, the defendant
loses his option to remain silent and hope that without this evidence,
the resulting award will be small. '0 In the absence of financial evi-
dence, "[p]resumably the award will be low and the defendant [re-
tains] the option to contend it is excessive."' 5 Also, the plaintiff's
access to financial evidence is restricted until after he presents a
prima facie case for punitive damages, so the trial may be inter-
rupted to allow the plaintiff to obtain discovery of the required infor-
mation. 6 "[A] plaintiff who believes the subpoenaed information is
inaccurate, incomplete or misleading will be forced to request a con-
tinuance ... to obtain accurate information which he was barred
from obtaining earlier."' 0 The court concluded that this problem
could be avoided if the plaintiff could choose not to introduce evi-
dence of the defendant's financial condition." 8
F. Limits on Access to and Use of Financial Condition Evidence
1. Constitutional Limits
California recognizes a constitutional right to privacy as it re-
lates to financial information." 9 Although a punitive damages claim
will subject the defendant's financial status to discovery, 10 the dis-
103. Id.
104. Fenlon, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
105. Id. at 328-29.
106. Id. at 329.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Richards v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (Ct. App. 1978) (noting that the
California Constitution provides at least a limited privacy right relating to financial informa-
tion); see also City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 231-32 (Cal. 1970) (noting
that privacy in financial affairs is protected by the U.S. Constitution).
110. Coy v. Superior Court, 373 P.2d 457, 463 (Cal. 1962).
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
covery permitted will be that which is the least intrusive to the de-
fendant's privacy right. The defendant need only disclose financial
information when there is some public purpose for which the infor-
mation is relevant such as judicial dispute resolution."' 1 The privacy
concern is given great weight in that disclosure can be limited by "a
properly fashioned protective order."11 "[Elven when the balance
tips in favor of disclosure, constitutional concerns require a strict cir-
cumscription of the scope of disclosure." 1 8
2. Civil Code Section 3295
In addition to the California Constitution, Civil Code section
3295 also governs a plaintiff's access to and use of information relat-
ing to the defendant's financial condition." 4 Adopted in 1979, this
section provides protection for a civil defendant in the form of pro-
tective orders," 5 limits on discovery"" and trial bifurcation"' if he
111. Richards, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
112. Id.
113. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1993).
115. Id. § 3295(a). This section states in part:
(a) The court may, for good cause, grant any defendant a protective order
requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of a prima facie case of liability for
damages pursuant to Section 3294, prior to the introduction of evidence of:
(1) The profits the defendant has gained by virtue of the wrongful course
of conduct of the nature and type shown by the evidence.
(2) The financial condition of the defendant.
Id.
116. Id. § 3295(c). This section states in part:
(c) No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be permitted with respect to
the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) unless the
court enters an order permitting such discovery pursuant to this subdivision.
However, the plaintiff may subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at
the trial for the purpose of establishing profits or financial condition referred to
in subdivision (a) . . . Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate
affidavits and after a hearing, if the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the
court may at any time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise prohib-
ited by this subdivision if the court finds . . . that the plaintiff has established
that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim
pursuant to Section 3294.
Id.
117. Id. § 3295(d). This section states:
(d) The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admis-
sion of evidence of that defendant's profits or financial condition until after the
trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds
that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud in accordance with
Section 3294. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be admissible only
as to the defendant or defendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. Evidence of profit and financial condition
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wishes to keep his financial condition from being a major focus at the
trial." 8
The courts and the legislature are serious about protecting the
defendant from discovery abuse involving his financial position." 9 In
Rawnsley v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal stated:
These [Civil Code] safeguards were designed to protect the de-
fendant from a specific type of discovery abuse: a situation in
which the plaintiff puts forth an easily alleged cause of action
for punitive damages, thus requiring a defendant to expend the
time and money "necessary to the compilation of a complex
mass of information unrelated to the substantive claim involved
in the lawsuit and relevant only to the subject matter of a mea-
sure of damages which may never be awarded."1"0
The anti-abuse policy is so strong that there is a presumption in
favor of the defendant when the plaintiff seeks discovery of financial
information.' One court stated:
where the only reason for seeking such financial information is
to 'give a tactical edge to the party who has obtained discovery
of the information by allowing that party the benefit of pressure
in settlement negotiations by threat or implication of disclosure,'
[the defendant] should be afforded the full benefit [of the Civil
Code protections].122
Thus, unrestricted discovery encourages "game playing" whereby
the plaintiff, in alleging a punitive damages claim, forces a defendant
to settle because the defendant wishes to preserve the confidentiality
of his financial circumstances. 23
shall be presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and found
one or more defendants guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud.
Id.
118. See id. § 3295. "At trial, for good cause shown, the court may require a plaintiff
to produce evidence of a prima facie case of 'oppression, fraud or malice before introducing
evidence as to defendant's financial condition or the profits allegedly derived by its wrongful
course of conduct." Guy 0. KORNBLUM ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: BAD FAITH
11-66 (1990).
119. See supra part II.F.I.
120. Rawnsley v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted).
121. See Richards v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (Ct. App. 1978).
122. Rawnsley, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 808.
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G. The Adams v. Murakami Decision
Adams v. Murakami"2' held that a plaintiff in a punitive dam-
ages case must present evidence of a defendant's financial condition
in order to obtain a punitive damages award. 25 The California Su-
preme Court stated that "[w]ithout such evidence, reviewing courts
will be unduly restricted in their attempts to assess whether awards
of punitive damages are excessive." ' 6 Adams was decided five,
months after the United States Supreme Court decided Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, which presented a due process
challenge to an Alabama punitive damages award."' The Adams
majority was clearly aware of the Haslip message that "unlimited
jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in
the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar
one's constitutional sensibilities." 2  In fact, Adams noted that the
United States Supreme Court had remanded several California cases
''apparently to determine whether the California 'passion and
prejudice' standard of review is constitutionally sufficient." ' The
Adams court emphasized that its decision was one of state law, yet it
devoted an entire section in the opinion to a discussion of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Haslip.'3 ' The court noted that appel-
late review of punitive damages awards "has recently acquired a fed-
eral constitutional dimension, which although not dispositive, weighs
strongly in favor of requiring evidence of a defendant's financial
condition." ' 2
In his dissent, Justice Mosk reasoned that the Haslip decision
indicated the Supreme Court believed that the defendant's wealth
should not be emphasized. 3 He cited the Haslip defendant's argu-
ment that considering wealth "only insures that multi-million dollar
awards will happen," and he noted the Supreme Court's observation
124. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991).
125. Id. at 1349, 1357; see also text accompanying notes 7-10.
126. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1355.
127. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). Adams was decided
August 15, 1991, and Haslip was decided March 4, 1991.
128. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
129. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043. The Haslip court continued: "We can say, however,
that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is
tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus." Id.
130. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1357 n.9. Adams specifically left open the question of whether
the California standard of passion and prejudice is constitutionally sufficient after Haslip. Id.
at 1356 n.9.
131. Id. at 1355-56.
132. Id. at 1355.
133. Id. at 1364 (Mosk, J., dissenting); Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
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that "the fact finder must be guided by more than the defendant's
net worth. Alabama plaintiffs do not enjoy a windfall because they
have the good fortune to have a defendant with a deep pocket. '134
The Adams decision also relied heavily on Neal v. Farmers In-
surance Exchange.8 All three Neal factors-the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct in light of the entire record, the amount of com-
pensatory damages, and the wealth of the defendant-were
considered necessary by Adams: "The Neal court set forth three fac-
tors, explaining the importance of each. Nothing in Neal suggests
that any of the three is dispensable."1 6 The Adams court stated that
the most important issue "is whether the amount of punitive dam-
ages will have a deterrent effect-without being excessive. 13 7 The
court noted that the "well-established rule [is] that a punitive dam-
ages award is excessive if it is disproportionate to the defendant's
ability to pay."' '38 In stressing the public purpose of punitive dam-
ages," 9 the court stated that the principle of proportionality would
be violated because the reviewing court could not evaluate a punitive
damages award absent evidence of the defendant's wealth. 4 Thus,
Adams concluded that evidence of the defendant's financial condition
is imperative.
The Adams majority concluded by holding that the statutory
punitive damages scheme, including Civil Code section 3295,41
should be interpreted according to the traditional burden of proof,1 41
with the plaintiff having the burden of proving the elements of a
punitive damages claim. The "very nature of punitive damages
points to this conclusion." 43 The court also cited the Legislative
Counsel's Digest in support of its argument, which read: "In gen-
eral, the application of this provision is governed by case law which
generally provides that the plaintiff has the burden of proof .... "14"
134. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1364 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pa-
cific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1045 (1991)).
135. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1350-52; Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980 (Cal.
1978); see supra part II.C. for a discussion of Neal.
136. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1351.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1352.
139. Id. at 1350 (The "purpose [of punitive damages] is a purely public one.").
140. Id. at 1352.
141. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1993).
142. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1357-59. "The apparent legislative intent underlying the pu-
nitive damages statutes is also consonant with having plaintiff assume [the burden of proof]."
Id. at 1359.
143. Id. at 1357.
144. Id. at 1359 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Legis. Council's Digest, ch. 778, 4 Cal.
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The court further held that nothing in section 3295 suggests a bur-
den for defendants to produce financial condition evidence. 145 Justice
Mosk, in his dissent, however, disagreed with the majority's charac-
terization and interpretation. Justice Mosk argued instead that Civil
Code section 3295 is correctly interpreted as an attempt to "protect
defendants by limiting the plaintiff's pretrial discovery of [financial
condition evidence].' 146
The Adams majority relied on section 500 of the California Ev-
idence Code for its burden of proof conclusion: "Except as otherwise
provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the
existence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that
he is asserting. ' 147 This section "mandated" that the plaintiff be re-
sponsible for proving defendant's financial condition.'48 Therefore,
the court concluded that "Evidence Code section 500 and considera-
tions of fundamental fairness lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff
who seeks to recover punitive damages must bear the burden of es-
tablishing the defendant's financial condition."' 49
In dissent, Justice Mosk argued that the current statutory
scheme did not require the plaintiff to prove the defendant's financial
condition.' He agreed with the Hanley line of cases which con-
cluded that "to require the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the de-
fendant's financial condition to preserve meaningful appellate review
for the defendant is unprecedented.''5
Furthermore, Justice Mosk argued that the " 'burden of proof'
is not relevant in considering the relationship between a defendant's
financial condition and the amount of the punitive damages
award." '152 He also contended that the majority misread the Legisla-
tive Counsel's Digest.5 He argued instead that the legislature, in
discussing the burden of proof, was referring to the plaintiff's burden
of proving oppression, fraud or malice, rather than the defendant's
Stat. 227 (1979)).
145. Id. at 1360.
146. Id. at 1364 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
147. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1978).
148. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1357.
149. Id. at 1360.
150. See id. at 1364 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Mosk contends that
neither the California statutory punitive damages scheme nor the Supreme Court's opinion in
Haslip require evidence of defendant's financial condition. Therefore, he contends that no one
is responsible for upholding a burden of proof on this issue. Id.; see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1045 (1991).
151. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1363 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1364 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
153. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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financial condition. 16 4
III. ANALYSIS
The Adams court addressed a challenge to a punitive damages
award in which the challenger argued the award could not stand
absent evidence of the defendant's financial condition.'65 The court
concluded that such evidence is a prerequisite for a punitive damages
award and that the plaintiff was to bear both the burdens of produc-
tion and proof.1 56 In California, the jury decides whether to impose
punitive damages and if so, how much. 5' Also, the Adams decision
did not purport to alter the jury's traditional role in assessing puni-
tive damages in the first place. Rather, the court was concerned with
judicial review of jury verdicts.' 58
The Adams decision, however, is not in agreement with the pu-
nitive damages scheme currently in place in California. Although
Adams appears to be a victory for the defendant, limiting punitive
damages awards, such a victory actually may be a pyrrhic one. Re-
quiring the plaintiff to be responsible for presenting the defendant's
financial condition to the jury may actually inflate the potential re-
ward. Also, the demands Adams places on the plaintiff directly con-
flict with the protective system the Civil Code provides for the de-
fendant. If the financial evidence requirement overcomes the
protective policy of Civil Code section 3295, the defendant is sub-
jected to discovery of his financial matters, with the extreme result
being a threat to his constitutional rights to privacy. Conversely, if
the discovery protection is taken to their logical end, the plaintiff
154. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1364 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
155. See discussion supra parts I, II.G.
156. See discussion supra parts I, II.G. Justice Mosk questions the Adams majority's
conclusion that evidence of wealth must be presented. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1362-64 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
In fact, there are other possible punitive damages procedures in which such evidence is
never put before the jury. The Alabama punitive damages procedure recently approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Haslip involves a post-verdict appellate review of the jury's
punitive damages verdict. See generally Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032
(1991). The jury never hears evidence of the defendant's financial condition. Id. 111 S. Ct. at
1044. One source suggests that the jury could determine damages as a percentage of financial
condition without revealing actual dollar figures of the defendant's assets, net worth or finan-
cial status. KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., REMEDIES 134 (1992). In her dissenting opinion in
Haslip, Justice O'Connor suggested that "[o]ther procedural safeguards might prove equally
effective. For example, state legislatures could establish fixed monetary limits for awards of
punitive damages involving particular kinds of conduct." Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1064
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)
157. See supra part II.B.2.
158. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1356.
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may be precluded from obtaining an otherwise justified award of pu-
nitive damages."
On its face, Civil Code section 3295 does not compel production
of financial condition evidence.160 Thus the section addresses a situa-
tion where a plaintiff chooses to present financial condition evidence.
However, after Adams, the section may severely restrict the plain-
tiff's ability to obtain punitive damages even when justified. On the
one hand, the plaintiff is compelled to produce evidence of defend-
ant's financial condition in order to sustain a punitive damages
award."' Yet at the same time, in order to prevent abuse of the
defendant, the plaintiff must demonstrate a "substantial probability"
of prevailing on the punitive damages claim 62 to obtain court orders
permitting discovery of financial information. 6 ' The irony is that
the plaintiff must obtain permission through a court order to conduct
required trial procedures.
The plaintiff faces a difficult uphill battle to overcome the pre-
sumptions favoring the defendant in both the discovery and presenta-
tion stages of the trial. He is, therefore, left with two options. He
either will have to accept the witnesses and documents that he is
currently allowed to subpoena for use at the trial'" or undertake
additional discovery during the trial. But what if the defendant is
particularly persuasive, convincing the trial court that some or all
financial information is not discoverable? What if the trial court is
not convinced that plaintiff has shown a substantial probability of
prevailing on the punitive damages claim? If the plaintiff neverthe-
less prevails, recovering punitive damages which the defendant sub-
sequently claims are excessive, is the defendant rewarded on appeal
by having the damages set aside for insufficient evidence? The Ad-
ams court does not address these possibilities.
The Adams decision thus strongly encourages the defendant to
concentrate his efforts to evade the plaintiff's discovery. This encour-
agement is in addition to an existing incentive to evade discovery: the
defendant already wishes to keep his wealth from becoming a major
focus at the trial. He does not want his financial circumstances to
influence the jury's determination of liability and compensatory dam-
159. See infra text accompanying notes 160-68.
160. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1993).
161. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1349, 1357.
162. § 3295(c).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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ages."' Amendments to Civil Code section 3295 solved this tainting
problem by allowing the defendant to bifurcate the trial, separating
the issue of liability for compensatory damages from liability for pu-
nitive damages.' 6 The Adams decision, however, recreates this same
dilemma for the defendant at the punitive damages stage of the trial.
The defendant now has an even greater incentive to prevent the
introduction of financial evidence. Because the stakes are so high,
Adams will encourage evasive maneuvers and sharp tactics by the
defendant to exclude financial evidence. If successful in persuading
the court to exclude this evidence, the defendant accomplishes two
things. First, he keeps evidence relating to his wealth from the jury,
thus preventing his wealth from encouraging the jury to find for the
plaintiff on the question of liability for punitive damages.' 6 7 Second,
even if the jury is allowed to hear financial condition evidence, the
defendant may be able to exclude some of the evidence. He can then
appeal, arguing that the punitive damages award cannot stand. The
defendant could cite the necessity of evaluating the award in light of
his ability to pay and then point to the trial record. If the defendant
was reasonably successful in excluding some financial evidence, the
record may be deemed insufficient for informed appellate review.
The appellate court would be forced to set aside the verdict, and the
defendant would escape an arguably deserved punishment because of
procedural requirements. Thus, the defendant clearly has a strong
incentive to concentrate his efforts to exclude financial evidence,
which ultimately frustrates the Adams objective of informed appel-
late review.' 68
The Adams decision also offers strategic opportunities for the
plaintiff. If the trial court closely adheres to Adams, the protective
nature of Civil Code section 3295 may well be ignored. Thus, the
Adams decision encourages a plaintiff to take advantage of potential
discovery opportunities. The trial court may deny defendant's mo-
tions for protective orders and allow the plaintiff increased access to
the defendant's financial material, justifying this with the Adams
ruling that this information is imperative for an informed assessment
of punitive damages.
165. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1358-59.
166. § 3295(d); see supra note 117 for the text of this section.
167. See Adams, 813 P.2d at 1358-59 (noting that prejudice is likely when the jury
decides liability for punitive damages at the same time it determines the amount). Civil Code
§ 3295(d) allows the jury to determine whether to impose punitive damages and the amount at
the same time. See supra note 117 for the text of this section.
168. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1351.
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Moreover, it is also possible that the trial court will uninten-
tionally moderate the plaintiff's required preliminary showing, mak-
ing it easier for the plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing
on his punitive damages claim. It is unlikely that the court would
expressly lower the substantial probability standard required for ac-
cess to defendant's financial affairs.' 69 However, the trial court gen-
erally wishes to avoid having the appellate court remand due to a
less than complete record. The trial court, therefore, may grant
greater deference in evaluating the probability that plaintiff will pre-
vail on the punitive damages award. If this threshold is lowered,
even unintentionally, plaintiff's resulting access to defendant's finan-
cial matters assures the trial court that the record will be sufficient.
The problem is that plaintiffs with otherwise questionable capacity
to prevail on their punitive damages claims would be able to obtain
substantial discovery of defendant's financial circumstances. Not only
is this a waste of time, it is also an unnecessary invasion of the de-
fendant's privacy.
Adams states that "[u]nlike the defendant, the plaintiff faces no
risk" in introducing evidence of the defendant's wealth.'7 Although
he may face no risk, the plaintiff should not be given the opportunity
to squeeze a large award out of the jury by flaunting the defendant's
wealth. The purpose of punitive damages is not to remedy the plain-
tiff with huge punitive damages awards. However, the Adams deci-
sion creates precisely this risk. By demanding that the plaintiff pre-
sent defendant's financial circumstances, Adams gives "a green light
[to] plaintiffs to get in and muck around with all kinds of private
financial information that [is] none of their business."''
Plaintiffs will seek to introduce evidence of defendants' financial
condition, not only to preserve a trial record, but also as a trial strat-
egy. 7 ' One trial attorney stated in his book about punitive damages
techniques that "it . . . helps immensely with the jury to show the
income and wealth of the defendant.' 7  The reality is that a plain-
tiff will likely present evidence that suggests to the jury that the de-
fendant can withstand a large punitive damages award. Control of
169. § 3295(c); see supra note 116 for the text of this section.
170. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1359.
171. Court Takes Hit at Punitives, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 2, 1991, at 1, 37.
172. RILEY, supra note 6, § 9.11, at 98 (1981)); see Adams, 813 P.2d at 1359. Riley
directs plaintiff's counsel to discover defendant's wealth, suggesting that counsel both investi-
gate a corporate defendant with investor services, and review advertising campaigns. RILEY,
supra note 6, § 9.13 - .14, at 100-01.
173. RILEY, supra note 6, § 9.11, at 98.
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the presentation of this evidence by the plaintiff can lead to a manip-
ulation in order to gain a greater punitive damages award. This
practice, though perhaps widespread, 17 4 is contrary to the policy of
punitive damages, which the California courts have reiterated is a
public one.1 5 Attempting to gain a larger award for the sake of a
larger award violates the punishment and deterrence rationale of pu-
nitive damages. Allowing such attempts tends toward permitting pu-
nitive damages to remedy the plaintiff, which is not the purpose of
these types of damages.17 6
The alternative is to require the defendant to produce evidence
of his own financial position. The Adams court argues that this is
unfair in light of the realities of trial practice because it forces the
defendant to "bid against himself.I' M The court, however, exagger-
ates the defendant's plight. The defendant is not likely to remain
silent about his financial position while the plaintiff presents finan-
cial evidence that the defendant believes is ambiguous. Nor will the
defendant remain silent while plaintiff presents evidence that is
skewed to make the defendant appear excessively wealthy. In prac-
tice, the plaintiff will take advantage of every opportunity to increase
the amount of punitive damages. The defendant is going to rebut
evidence perceived as promoting larger punitive damages awards.
Thus, having the defendant produce financial evidence is no more
burdensome for the defendant than routinely countering the plain-
tiff's case.
It is not unfair for the defendant to bear the responsibility for
placing financial evidence in the trial record. First, as the court rec-
ognized in Vossler, defendants can skillfully present mitigating evi-
dence in other trial contexts such as refuting liability.'77 There is no
reason to treat the punitive damages situation differently. Second,
given the expense of conducting a trial, creating a record for poten-
tial appellate review should be conducted efficiently. The defendant
is uniquely situated to present his own financial circumstances. By
definition, the defendant has the information required by Adams. It
is extremely inefficient to compel the plaintiff to request and obtain
174. Id. at 101-02. "Plaintiff's counsel has everything to gain and nothing to lose by
utilizing the rule that permits (and if the verdict is high) compels introduction of the defend-
ant's wealth." Id.
175. See supra parts I.B.I, I.C.
176. See supra part II.B.1 for a discussion of the purpose of punitive damages in
California.
177. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1358.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
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permission, conduct discovery, and then present the results while the
defendant is opposing each request. The defendant could simply pre-
sent the evidence himself, which would avoid the waste of time and
resources that occurs when the plaintiff is filing motions and con-
ducting discovery mid-trial.
Although it does not address the issue of efficiency, the Adams
majority attempts to justify its decision by arguing that the roles of
the plaintiff and defendant are in keeping with the legislative intent
regarding burden of proof. Traditionally, the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proving the elements of his cause of action. He is required to
prove the defendant's liability for punitive damages by the California
standard. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant is guilty of fraud, oppression or malice."O However, evi-
dence of the defendant's financial condition is not an element of a
cause of action for punitive damages.1 80
The Adams court stated that its decision was based on funda-
mental fairness and policy. 1 ' However, if these are the important
considerations, the Adams decision is backwards. To preserve the
statutory protection in place for defendants, to be fair to plaintiffs,
and to remain true to the purpose of punitive damages, the plaintiff
should not be required to prove the defendant's wealth. This infor-
mation would be better presented and proven by the defendant. Since
the function of punitive damages is a public one, benefiting society
by deterring harmful conduct,18 it is unfair for the plaintiff to
shoulder the entire burden of ensuring that purpose is served, partic-
ularly since the information is specifically within the control of the
defendant. Fairness and efficiency demonstrate this responsibility is
properly placed on the defendant. Plaintiff's position is not harmed,
as he will have the same ability to determine whether the defendant's
statements of financial situation are accurate as he has under the
current Civil Code. Furthermore, plaintiff will be relieved of the
burden of proving an issue that is not an element of his claim for
punitive damages."' 8
179. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993).
180. See id.
181. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1357.
182. See supra part II.B.1 for a discussion of the purpose of punitive damages in
California.
183. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993). For the text of this section, see
supra text accompanying note 48.
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. Reconsideration of Burdens of Production and Proof
This comment proposes that the legislature consider the practi-
cal impact of the Adams decision. It is possible to achieve the Adams
court's goal of meaningful appellate review and yet remain true to
the purpose and policy of punitive damages in California. The legis-
lature should focus on the defendant as the source for financial con-
dition evidence. This will not frustrate the legislative intent to pro-
tect defendants since the defendant is more in control of what, when,
and how this information is disclosed. Therefore, the privacy con-
cerns of the defendant receive greater deference without forfeiting the
placement of evidence in the trial record. Meaningful appellate re-
view can be achieved by utilizing the party with the best access to
the required information. The current Civil Code procedures can
prevent the defendant from abusing the system by withholding or
selectively presenting financial information because the plaintiff may
use the available discovery procedures as a check on the defendant's
presentation of evidence.""
B. Amendment of Civil Code Section 3295(d)
Protecting the defendant from discovery abuse is a significant
aspect of the California punitive damages scheme.'85 Also, the fair-
ness of placing the burden on defendant to prove his financial condi-
tion is an important factor in Adams. 8 ' Accordingly, the Civil Code
should be amended to return to this protective policy in the wake of
the Adams decision. It is also important to respond to the court's
contention that fairness requires the plaintiff to present evidence of
the defendant's financial condition.'87 The Adams court stressed the
importance of bifurcating issues to prevent prejudice, concluding that
there was "a serious risk of prejudice to the defendant .. . if the
defendant is required to prove his own finances."' 8 This comment
proposes that the risk for the defendant, if any, due to presenting
evidence of his own wealth can be reduced drastically if not elimi-
nated. As discussed above, current Civil Code section 3295(d) allows
the defendant, upon application to the court, to bifurcate the trial
184. See supra part II.F for a discussion of the discovery procedures in a punitive dam-
ages case.
185. See supra part II.F.2.
186. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1357, 1358-60.
187. Id. at 1357; see supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
188. Id. at 1358-59.
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between the issues of (1) liability for compensatory damages and (2)
whether punitive damages should be imposed."8 9 To alleviate
prejudice in the second part of the trial, this comment proposes addi-
tional bifurcation of the trial. Bifurcating the trial once again will
result in a trifurcation: a three-phase trial. The jury will first decide
the defendant's liability for compensatory damages and whether he
acted with oppression, malice or fraud. The jury next would con-
sider whether punitive damages should be imposed. If the jury de-
cides to impose such damages, it will determine the amount in the
third stage, where the financial evidence will be admitted for the first
time. This is simply an extension of the policy supporting Civil Code
section 3295(d) that allows the defendant to separate liability from
compensatory issues.
One potential criticism of the "trifurcation" proposal is the in-
creased time and expense of a three-phased trial. However, if the
jury concludes punitive damages will not be assessed, there will be
no need to expend time and resources presenting financial evidence.
If punitive damages are imposed, the defendant is better able to pro-
ceed with evidence of his financial condition than is the plaintiff. If
the plaintiff were required to present the evidence, he would likely
need to conduct discovery mid-trial to obtain access to information
which was restricted earlier in the trial.
The defendant might request a continuance to prepare his pres-
entation of the evidence. However, this is probably less time consum-
ing than the plaintiff conducting discovery at mid-trial. A continu-
ance for the defendant would require much less time because the
financial information is already at the defendant's disposal. With the
defendant producing the evidence, the plaintiff will be in the same
position that he is under Civil Code section 3295. He may subpoena
witnesses and documents for availability at trial, and can use this
evidence as provided in Civil Code section 3294. He may use it to
present arguments about the defendant's financial status but without
any burden of proof. The plaintiff may still cross-examine the de-
fendant in order to temper the defendant's version of his financial
status, but there is less opportunity to abuse the purpose of punitive
damages. The plaintiff will be unable to use the financial condition
evidence to increase the punitive damages award by implying in the
presentation that the defendant is extremely wealthy and hoping the
jury will adopt a "rich defendants can afford it" attitude.
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1993); see supra note 117 for the text of
this section.
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As amended, Civil Code section 3295(d) should read:
(d) The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude
the admission of evidence of that defendant's profits or financial
condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plain-
tiff awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud in accordance with Section
3294. The court shall, on application of any defendant, fur-
ther preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant's
profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact re-
turns a verdict for plaintiff that punitive damages will be
awarded. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be ad-
missible only as to the defendant or defendants found to be lia-
ble to the plaintiff and to be guilty of malice, oppression, or
fraud. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be
presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff
and found one or more defendants guilty of malice, oppression,
or fraud.190
C. Revision of California Jury Instructions
Allowing the defendant to trifurcate the trial under the pro-
posed Civil Code section 3295(d) necessitates jury instructions for
the new second and third phases of the trial. In phase two of the
trial, the jury will decide whether punitive damages are to be im-
posed. A proposed jury instruction follows:
BAJI 14.72.2
PUNITIVE DAMAGES - ASSESSMENT
(TRIFURCATED TRIAL - SECOND PHASE)
You must now determine whether you should award puni-
tive damages against defendant[s] [ _ only] for the sake
of example and by way of punishment. Whether punitive dam-
ages should be imposed is left to your sound discretion, exer-
cised without passion or prejudice.191
Once the jury has determined that punitive damages will be im-
posed, it will then decide the amount of the award. Separating the
issue of whether to impose punitive damages from the question of
amount prevents the jury from considering defendant's wealth in de-
ciding whether it will award punitive damages at all.
Furthermore, this comment proposes a jury instruction regard-
190. The proposed amendments are indicated by italics.
191. This is simply a modification of the current jury instructions. See CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, supra note 45, BAJI 14.72.2 (1989 Re-Revision).
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ing the purpose of punitive damages. This instruction warns that the
presentation of financial condition evidence is not to be interpreted as
an admission of liability when assessing the amount of the award.
The jury should be aware that the defendant is required by law to
present the evidence and that the fact of his presentation has no
bearing on the amount of punitive damages awarded. A proposed
jury instruction for the third phase follows:
PUNITIVE DAMAGES - MEASUREMENT
(TRIFURCATED TRIAL - THIRD PHASE)
You have determined that punitive damages should be
awarded against defendant[s] [ only] for the sake of
example and by way of punishment. BAJI 14.72.3
You must now determine the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded. The amount of the award is left to your sound discre-
tion, exercised without passion or prejudice.
In arriving at the amount of the punitive damages award,
you must consider:
(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant.
(2) The amount of punitive damages which will have a de-
terrent effect in light of the defendant's financial condition.
[(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable re-
lation to the injury, harm, or damage actually suffered by the
plaintiff. 1 9 2
You have heard evidence of the defendant's financial condi-
tion. Defendant is required by law to present this evidence. The
fact of presentation has no bearing on the amount of the award.
The fact of defendant's presentation is not to be considered an
admission of liability or a suggestion that any particular amount
of punitive damages should or should not be awarded.
The purpose of the last paragraph is to guard against prejudice
by preventing the jury from concluding the defendant simply is try-
ing to "weasel out'? of the award. This reduces the possibility that
the jury will increase its award out of anger or annoyance with the
presentation itself. Also, it prevents the jury from awarding large
punitive damages simply because the defendant is wealthy.
V. CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of providing evidence for the reviewing court
192. The use note for current California BAJI 14.72.2 indicates that the bracketed par-
agraph must be given if requested by the defendant. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CIVIL, supra note 45, BAJI 14.72.2 (1989 Re-Revision).
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to make a "reasonably informed decision"'"9 regarding a punitive
damages award can be achieved without increasing the plaintiff's
burdens or sacrificing the legislative policy of protection for the de-
fendant's financial circumstances. In his dissent, Justice Mosk criti-
cized the Adams majority for "indulg[ing] in judicial legislating."' 94
If the Adams decision reflects judicial legislating, the court either
should have finished the job or deferred to the legislature. By requir-
ing financial condition evidence without making corresponding
changes in current civil procedure, the court creates contradictory
and confusing punitive damages procedures. By compelling the
plaintiff to prove the defendant's wealth, the court may actually be
limiting the kind and quality of evidence placed in the trial record.
This ultimately frustrates the objective of informed appellate review.
If protecting the defendant from excessive punitive damages awards
is to be accomplished by meaningful appellate review, it is the legis-
lature's responsibility to incorporate procedures such as those dis-
cussed in this comment.
Barbara Eckert Buchanan
193. Adams, 813 P.2d at 1352.
194. Id. at 1365 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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